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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1968, the federal government has been concerned with the rash of
business takeovers and their impact on the shareholders of acquired companies.
Congress believed that these shareholders were not being properly informed about
their options and were being forced to sell their shares out of fear that they would not
receive adequate compensation if they waited for a better offer. I In response to these
concerns, Congress adopted amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act)2 to provide time and protection for shareholders of target corpora-
tions. These amendments, known as the Williams Act,3 provided reporting and time
requirements that an acquiring company must follow during the takeover process.
Since the enactment of the Williams Act, many states have adopted their own form
of takeover legislation. In three recent cases, state statutes have been challenged on
the grounds that these statutes are preempted by the Williams Act and violate the
commerce clause of the Constitution. The Illinois takeover statute was challenged in
Edgar v. MITE Corp.4 The Indiana statute was challenged in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America.5 Ohio's Control Share Acquisition Act6 has been challenged in
Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman.7 One focus of this Note will be to use these
challenges to illustrate the progressing state and judicial attitudes toward state
antitakeover legislation.
This Note first looks at the policy behind the Williams Act amendments to the
Exchange Act. The Illinois takeover law is then examined along with the Supreme
Court's rationale in holding the statute unconstitutional. This Note then analyzes the
Court's distinction between Indiana's takeover statute and the Illinois law. Ohio's
takeover statute is then compared to both the Illinois and Indiana acts to determine if
the Ohio statute is likely to be held constitutional. In addition, this Note discusses
how states have circumvented the intent of the Williams Act with the blessing of the
Supreme Court. Finally, this Note proposes amendments to the Williams Act aimed
at ending this circumvention.
1. S. RFt. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted
in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADomiN. NEws 2811, 2812 [hereinafter 1968 U.S. CODE NEws].
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) [hereinafter Exchange Act].
3. The Williams Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
781-n (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) (amending Exchange Act §§ 12-14(a), (c), and 16).
4. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
5. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
6. Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Anderson 1982).
7. 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded sub nom. Ohio v. Fleet Aerospace, 107 S. Ct. 1949
(1987).
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II. THE WILLIAMS Acr
Prior to 1968, companies wanting to acquire other companies were required to
register their offer under the Securities Act only if the offer was a stock-for-stock
exchange. 8 With cash offers, however, the acquiring company was not required to
disclose information to the shareholders of the target company. 9 The lack of
information about the cash offer added to the shareholders' already difficult decision
of whether or not to tender their shares.
In any takeover situation, the target's shareholders have several alternatives.
First, the shareholders can tender all their shares with the hope that all the shares will
be purchased. Second, if the offer is for less than all the shares, the shareholders can
tender some of their shares. Third, they can wait and hope that another company, or
the target company, will make a better offer. Here, shareholders run the risk of not
being able to dispose of their shares. Fourth, they can hold on to the stock in
anticipation that the acquiring corporation will make the stock even more profitable.
Finally, the shareholders may take their shares into the marketplace and determine if
they can receive a better offer. In each of these alternatives, the shareholders run the
risk of not choosing the alternative that will provide the best return on their
investment. The probability of an incorrect choice is increased when the shareholders
have inadequate time and information to make their investment decision.
Congress was concerned that the shareholders of target companies did not have
adequate time or information needed to decide rationally the best possible course of
action.10 To address these concerns, Congress enacted the Williams Act. The
Williams Act added to the Exchange Act sections 14(d)II and (e) t2 to regulate tender
offers and sections 13(d)13 and (e) 14 to establish disclosure requirements.15
The legislative history of section 13(d) states that "[t]he purpose of section 13(d)
is to require disclosure of information by persons who have acquired a substantial
interest, or increased their interest in the equity securities of a company by a
substantial amount, within a relatively short period of time."16 This section removes
the nondisclosure problem previously arising in cash tender offers. Section 13(d) of
the Exchange Act requires any person who acquires more than five percent of a class
of securities registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act 17 to file a 13(d)
8. 1968 U.S. CODE NEws, supra note 1, at 2812. A stock-for-stock exchange occurs when the acquiring
corporation exchanges stock in the acquiring corporation for stock in the target corporation at a fixed ratio. See also
"Stock Swap," BLAcK's LAW DICnONARY 1272 (5th ed. 1979).
9. 1968 U.S. CODE NEws, supra note 1, at 2812.
10. Id.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(d) (1982).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1982).
15. See Fogelson, Wenig, & Friedman, Changing the Takeover Game: The Securities and Exchange Commission's
Proposed Amendments to the Williams Act, 17 HARV. J. ON LEots. 409, 412 (1980); Note, The Tender Offer: In Search
of a Definition, 43 WASH. & LEE L. Rev. 901 (1986).
16. 1968 U.S. CODE NEWS, supra note 1, at 2818.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78! (1982). Under § 12(g)(1), securities must be registered if traded on a national exchange or if
the offering is for more than $5 million and there are 500 or more subscribers. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1982).
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statement per schedule 13D.1 This statement must be sent, within ten days after the
acquisition, to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), to the issuer of the
securities at its principle executive office, and to each exchange on which the security
is traded.19 This section applies to anyone who owns more than five percent of the
class of stock being tendered before the acquisition, as well as to anyone who
becomes the owner of more than five percent of the class as a result of the
acquisition. 20 The required filing information includes:
(a) the background, identity, residence, and citizenship of the acquiror; (b) the source and
amount of the funds to be used in the purchase; (c) the purpose of the purchase and any plans
or proposals that the acquiror may have concerning possible liquidation of the issuer; (d) the
number of shares of the security that the acquiror owns and the number of shares there is a
right to acquire either by the acquiror or the acquiror's associate; and (e) information
regarding contracts, arrangements, or understandings with any party concerning any of the
shares of the issuer. 2'
Section 14(d)(1) requires an offeror who is attempting to acquire more than five
percent of any class of equity security through the use of a tender offer to first file a
schedule 14D-1 with the SEC.2 2 The schedule 14D-1 must include the source(s) of
funds used to make the purchase of the target shares, any past transactions with the
target corporation, and material financial information about the offeror.2 3 Finally,
section 14(d)(1) requires that the offeror publish or send a statement of the relevant
facts contained in schedule 14D-1 to the shareholders of the target company. 24
Section 14(d) permits shareholders of the target company who have tendered
their shares to withdraw their tender during the first seven days and after sixty days
from the date the offer is first published or given to the target's shareholders. 2s If the
offeror makes an offer to purchase less than all the outstanding shares of a class of
the target's stock, securities tendered during the first ten days of the offer, or within
ten days after notice of an increase in the offered consideration is first announced,
must be purchased on a pro rata basis.2 6 Also, if the offeror increases the amount of
consideration paid for each security, those shareholders who tendered their shares
before the increase must be paid the difference.2 7
Section 14(e), applicable to all tender offers, prohibits any type of fraud,
deception, or manipulation with respect to tender offers and gives the SEC the power
to make rules reasonably designed to prevent such acts.28 The SEC accordingly
18. Exchange Act § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982).
19. Exchange Act § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982).
20. Id.
21. Exchange Act § 13(d)(1)(A)-(E), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(A)-(E) (1982).
22. Exchange Act § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982).
23. Schedule 14D-I. Tender Offer Statement Pursuant to § 14(d)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1987).
24. Exchange Act § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982).
25. Exchange Act § 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982). Rule 14d-7 added to the withdrawal rights so that now
shareholders may withdraw their shares during the period the offer request or invitation remains open. Additional
Withdrawl Rights, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a) (1987). See infra text accompanying note 28.
26. Exchange Act § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982).
27. Exchange Act § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982).
28. Exchange Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
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enacted rule 14e-1,29 which requires that a tender offer must remain open for at least
twenty business days from the time the offer is published or made to the security
holders.30 If the offeror increases the consideration to be paid for each security, the
offer must remain open for ten business days from the time notice of the increase is
given.3' If the offer is terminated or withdrawn, the tendered securities must be paid
for promptly or returned. 32 The SEC also enacted rule 14e-2, 33 under which, after
making the offer, the management of the target company has ten business days to
inform the shareholders whether management recommends that the shareholders
accept or reject the offer.34 Management, however, may state that it is remaining
neutral or is unable to take a position, and the reasons therefore. 35
The structure of the Williams Act shows that Congress is concerned with
balancing the shareholders' interests in having adequate information and time to make
a decision with the offeror's interests in completing the transaction in the most
efficient way. The remainder of this Note shows how state takeover statutes upset this
balance. 36
III. THE ILLINOIS LAW AND EDGAR v. MITE
The Illinois takeover statute was the first takeover statute challenged in the
United States Supreme Court. The case, Edgar v. MITE Corp. ,37 involved the MITE
Corporation (MITE) and the Chicago Rivet and Machine Company. MITE initiated
a tender offer for all of the outstanding shares of the Chicago Rivet and Machine
Company. MITE filed the necessary documents with the SEC pursuant to the
Williams Act, but did not comply with the Illinois Business Takeover Act (Illinois
Act). MITE brought an action claiming that the Williams Act preempted the Illinois
Act and also that the Illinois Act was unconstitutional as a violation of the commerce
clause. 38
The Illinois Act required that a tender offeror notify the Secretary of State and
the target corporation of the offeror's intent to make a tender offer and the terms and
conditions of the offer twenty days before the offer became effective. 39 Within those
29. Unlawful Tender Offer Practices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1987).
30. Id. § 240.14e-l(a).
31. Id. § 240.14e-l(b).
32. Id. § 240.14e-1(c).
33. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1987). (Position of subject company with respect to a tender offer.).
34. Id. § 240.14e-2(a)(1).
35. Id. § 240.14e-2(a)(2)-(3). Having management provide a good faith recommendation helps the shareholders
since management has more information and knowledge of the corporation than the shareholders. See Booth, Is ThereAny
Valid Reason Why Target Managers Oppose Tender Offers?, 14 SEc. REG. L.J. 43, 56 (1986). The shareholders would
not spare the time or the expense to accumulate this information since shareholders have an incentive to remain passive.
See infra text accompanying notes 122-25.
36. This Note purposefully ignores a state's intent behind promulgating a control share acquisition statute. A state's
intent is irrelevant since this Note's concern is soley about whether the statute in fact violates the Williams Act.
37. 457 U.S. 624 (1982). For a more detailed analysis of the Illinois statute and the MITE decision, see Comment,
Tender Offers-Edgar v. MITE Corp. and State Tender Offer Regulation, 9 J. CoRp. L. 95 (1983); Note, A Failed
Experiment: State Takeover Regulation After Edgar v. MITE Corp., 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 457.
38. MITE, 457 U.S. at 626-30.
39. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, 137.54.E, 137.54.B (1979) (repealed 1983) (Supp. 1988); MITE, 457 U.S.
at 634-35.
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twenty days, the offeror was not permitted to communicate with the shareholders of
the target corporation regarding the offer. The target company, however, was free to
provide the shareholders with information concerning the impending offer. Also, a
hearing had to be held if either a majority of the target's outside directors or ten
percent of the Illinois shareholders of the class of securities subject to the offer
requested it. 40
The Illinois Act also required registration of the tender offer with the Secretary
of State. 4 1 A tender offer became registered after the twenty days unless the Secretary
of State called a hearing to adjudicate the substantive fairness of the offer. 42 In the
hearing, if the Secretary of State determined the offer to be unfair, the tender offer
could not be consummated.
The statute defined a target company as a corporation in which either Illinois
shareholders or a "specified company" owned ten percent of the class of securities
targeted in the tender offer. 43 A specified company was defined as one that met any
two of the following three conditions: the corporation had its principal office in
Illinois, was organized under Illinois law, or had at least twenty percent of its capital
and paid-in surplus represented within the state. 44
The Supreme Court found that Congress did not intend for the Williams Act to
prohibit states from making their own statutes to regulate tender offers; it left the
determination of the appropriateness of state regulation to the courts. 45 States may
regulate only to the extent that their statutes do not conflict with federal statutes; and
"[a] conflict will be found 'where compliance with both federal and state regulations
is a physical impossibility.. 46 or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'"47
The Court held, in a plurality opinion, that the Illinois Act was both an obstacle to
the purpose of the Williams Act48 and a violation of the commerce clause. 49 There
was no contention, however, that compliance with both the Williams Act and the
Illinois statute was impossible. 50
The Supreme Court held three provisions of the Illinois Act inconsistent with the
congressional objectives of the Williams Act. First, the Illinois Act required that the
offeror notify both the Secretary of State and the target company of the terms of the
offer twenty business days before the offer became effective. The Court held that this
additional time provided incumbent management an unfair advantage since they
would be able to coerce the shareholders into rejecting the offer even before it was
presented to them. Congress refused precommencement disclosure requirements
40. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, , 137.57.A (1979) (repealed 1983) (Supp. 1983); MITE, 457 U.S. at 627.
41. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, 137.54.A (1979) (repealed 1983) (Supp. 1988); MITE, 457 U.S. at 626-27.
42. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, 1 37.54.E (1979) (repealed 1983) (Supp. 1988); MITE, 457 U.S. at 627.
43. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, T 137.52-10 (1979) (repealed 1983) (Supp. 1988); MITE, 457 U.S. at 627.
44. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, f 137.52-10 (1979) (repealed 1983) (Supp. 1988); MITE, 457 U.S. at 627.
45. MITE, 457 U.S. at 631.
46. Id. (quoting Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978)).
47. Id. (quoting Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978)).
48. Id. at 639.
49. Id. at 646.
50. Id. at 631-32.
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several times before adopting the Williams Act.5' A twenty-day precommencement
disclosure requirement already had been refused after the SEC stated that "the
requirement of a 20 day advance notice to the issuer and the [Securities and
Exchange] Commission is unnecessary for the protection of securities
holders .... ,52 Precommencement disclosure provides no additional benefit to the
shareholders since they will not have any more time or information to help them make
their decision.
Second, permitting the Secretary of State or the target's management to request
a hearing introduced an undue delay into the tender offer process. The ability to delay
provides incumbent management the potential to thwart the takeover since delay is
"the most potent weapon in a tender offer fight.' '53
Third, the Court held that the Williams Act forbade the provisions in the Illinois
statute that allowed the Secretary of State to adjudicate the fairness of the offer. The
Court noted that both the House and the Senate decided that it was ultimately the
shareholders' decision whether an offer is fair and that the Williams Act only
intended to provide shareholders enough time and information to make the best
decision.5 4 A fairness hearing by the Secretary of State would take the investment
decision out of the hands of the shareholders and place it into the hands of the state.
In considering how the Illinois Act affected interstate commerce, the Court
noted that not every exercise of state power with some impact on interstate commerce
is invalid. The Court then applied the modern standard for state regulation stating that
"[a] state statute must be upheld if it 'regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental ... unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.' 55 The Court held that the Illinois Act violated
this standard in two ways.
First, the Illinois Act could prevent interstate tender offers that would generate
interstate transactions. The Illinois Act could be used to regulate a tender offer that
did not affect a single Illinois shareholder "since the [Illinois] Act applies to every
tender offer for a corporation meeting two of the following conditions: the
corporation has its principal executive office in Illinois, is organized under Illinois
law, or has at least 10 percent of its stated capital and paid-in-surplus represented in
Illinois.' '56 These provisions in the statute made the Illinois law applicable to some
corporations even if they were not an Illinois corporation. The Court held that this
attempt to exercise direct extraterritorial jurisdiction offended sister states and
exceeded the limits of the state's power. 57
51. Id. at 635.
52. MEaORANDUM OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N. TO THE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, U.S.
SENATE, ON S. 2731, 89th Cong., 2d sess., reprinted in 112 CoNo. REc. 19,005 (1966).
53. MITE, 457 U.S. at 637 n. 12 (quoting Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and
Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 213, 238 (1977)).
54. Id. at 639-40.
55. Id. at 640 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citing Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit,
362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960))).
56. Id. at 642.
57. Id. at 643.
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Second, the Court held that the Illinois Act imposed a burden on interstate
commerce in excess of any local interest. The Supreme Court noted that states
traditionally have regulated intrastate securities transactions. 58 But the Illinois Act
gave the state the power to block a nationwide tender offer. 59 The state had no
legitimate interest in protecting out of state shareholders. Since the Illinois Act did
not apply to a company purchasing its own shares, the target could make competing
offers without complying with the Illinois Act-the act Illinois claimed was essential
protection for investors.6"
The problems inherent in the Illinois Act provide a clear example of a state
legislature going too far to protect its corporations. Indiana, on the other hand,
enacted a protectionist statute that the Court held did not unduly affect interstate
commerce.
IV. INDIANA CONTROL SHARE AcQUISMON Acr AND THE CTS CORP. v. DYNAMICS
CORP. OF AMERICA DECISION
The Indiana Control Share Acquisition Chapter of the Indiana Business Corpo-
ration Law 61 (Indiana Statute) was the second state takeover statute challenged in the
Supreme Court. 62 In March 1986 Dynamics Corporation of America (Dynamics)
owned 9.6 percent of the common stock of the CTS Corporation. On March 10,
Dynamics made a tender offer to purchase an additional one million shares, which
would increase its holding to 27.5 percent. On March 27, the Board of Directors of
CTS elected to be governed by the Indiana statute. Four days later, Dynamics filed
a complaint against CTS alleging that the Williams Act preempted the Indiana statute
and that the Indiana statute violated the commerce clause. 63 Both the district court64
and the court of appeals, 65 citing the MITE66 decision, held that the Indiana statute was
preempted by the Williams Act and was a violation of the commerce clause. The
United States Supreme Court reversed. 67 The Indiana statute appears to have been
written to avoid the constitutional problems Illinois faced in the MITE decision.
The Indiana statute defines an "Issuing Public Corporation" as one with more
than 100 shareholders, with its principal place of business, principal office, or
substantial assets in Indiana, and with either more than ten percent of its shareholders
as Indiana residents, or more than ten thousand shareholder residents in Indiana. 68
58. Id. at 641.
59. Id. at 643-44.
60. Id. at 644.
61. IND. CODE § 23-1-42 (1986).
62. For a more detailed analysis of the Indiana Statute and the CTS decision, see Comment, Beyond CrS: A Limit-
edDefense Of State Tender Offer Disclosure Requirements, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 657 (1987); Brown, Paley, and Richman,
Does CTS Mean New Life For State Takeover Statutes?, NEw YORK LAw JOURNAL, July 27, 1987, at 21, col. 2.
63. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1642 (1987).
64. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986),
rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
65. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
66. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
67. CTS, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
68. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-4(a) (1986); CTS, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1641 (1987).
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Anyone who proposes to make a control share acquisition69 must present an
"acquiring person statement" at the issuing corporation's principal office. 70 The
statement must be given pursuant to the Indiana statute and must set forth the identity
of the acquiring person(s). 7' Also, the statute requires an acquiring person to state the
number of shares of the issuing corporation that the acquiring corporation and every
member of its group owns, the range of voting power under which the acquisition
falls, and, if the acquisition has not taken place, the terms of the acquisition and a
statement that the acquisition is lawful. 72 Finally, the acquirer must show that it has
the financial capacity to make the acquisition. 7
3
After presentation of the acquiring person statement, a special shareholders
meeting must be held to determine the voting rights that shares acquired in the control
shares acquisition will be accorded. 74 The meeting is held at the next special or
annual shareholders meeting unless the acquiring corporation requests a special
meeting. This meeting must be held within fifty days after the request and at the
expense of the acquirer. 75 The shareholders may vote to deny voting rights to the
shares held or to be purchased by the acquiring person.
The Supreme Court held that the Indiana statute could be distinguished from the
Illinois statute found unconstitutional in MITE in its regulation of takeovers and that
these distinctions prevented the statute from being unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court also dismissed the reasoning of the plurality opinion in MITE:
As the plurality opinion in MITE did not represent the views of a majority of the Court,
we are not bound by its reasoning. We need not question that reasoning, however, because
we believe the Indiana Act passes muster even under the broad interpretation of the Williams
Act articulated ... in MITE.76
The Supreme Court found three major differences between the Indiana statute
and the Illinois statute. First, the Illinois law provided for a twenty-day precommence-
ment period while Indiana did not. In MITE, the Court had found that Congress
explicitly rejected a precommencement notice requirement and that such precom-
mencement notice provided management the ability to communicate unilaterally with
the shareholders about the tender offer.77
Second, the Illinois law had been criticized for allowing incumbent management
an indefinite period in which to request a fairness hearing concerning the tender
offer. 78 The Indiana statute has no similar provision. Since time is one of the most
powerful weapons against a takeover attempt, allowing management to stall the
69. A control share acquisition generally occurs when an acquirer purchases enough shares in a corporation that,
when added to all other shares of that corporation previously acquired by that acquirer, enables the acquirer to exercise
direct control of the corporation through the voting power obtained. Control share acquisitions are specifically defined by
state statute. See "Control Share Acquisition" defined in INo. CODE § 23-1-42-2 (1986).
70. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-6 (1986).
71. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-6(t),(2) (1986).
72. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-6(3)-(5) (1986).
73. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-6(5)(B) (1986).
74. IND. COD § 23-1-42-7 (1986).
75. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-7(a),(b) (1986); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1642 (1987).
76. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am. 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1645 (1987) (footnote omitted).
77. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 635 (1982); see supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
78. MITE, 457 U.S. at 636-39.
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procedure indefinitely, in effect, gives management the power to squelch the
takeover. The Court, however, did note that not just any delay imposed by state
regulation would conflict with the Williams Act, only unreasonable delay. 79
Third, the Supreme Court held that allowing the Secretary of State to rule on the
fairness of the tender offer was inconsistent with the congressional objectives of the
Williams Act. 80 Again, the Indiana statute has no such provision. Shareholders, not
the Secretary of State, should decide the fairness of any tender offer. The Williams
Act purported to provide shareholders with enough time and information to make the
best decision possible.
The Supreme Court, in addition, held that the Indiana statute did not violate the
commerce clause. Unlike the Illinois Act, the Indiana law affects both interstate and
local business equally.8' That is, the Indiana Act does not impose a greater burden on
out-of-state offerors than exists for Indiana offerors. The Indiana Act only applies to
Indiana corporations while the Illinois Act had no such limitation. Therefore, all
Indiana corporations are treated the same while non-Indiana corporations are not
affected by the Indiana statute. The primary purpose of the Indiana statute is to
protect Indiana shareholders. The Court held it does this by "affording shareholders,
when a takeover offer is made, an opportunity to decide collectively whether the
resulting change in voting control of the corporation, as they perceive it, would be
desirable." 82 The current challenge to Ohio's takeover statute is in the wake of the
MITE and CTS decisions.
V. THE OHIO STATUTE AND FEET AEROSPACE V. HOLDERmAN
On May 21, 1986, Fleet Aerospace, a Canadian corporation, made a nationwide
tender offer to purchase any and all outstanding common stock of Aeronca, an Ohio
corporation. On that same day, Fleet Aerospace filed an action in federal district court
alleging the Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act83 (Ohio Act) violated the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution and was preempted by the Williams Act.
Both the district court84 and the court of appeals 8s held the Ohio Act unconstitutional
in light of the MITE decision. 86
The Ohio Act applies to all Ohio corporations with a principal place of business,
principal executive offices, or substantial assets in Ohio and having at least fifty
shareholders.8 7 Any person attempting a control share acquisition 88 must deliver an
79. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1647.
80. MITE, 457 U.S. 624, 639-40.
81. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1649.
82. Id. at 1651.
83. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Anderson 1985).
84. Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Ohio v. Fleet Aerospace Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987).
85. Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded sub nom. Ohio v.
Fleet Aerospace Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987).
86. Id. at 139; 637 F. Supp. 742, 755-65 (S.D. Ohio 1986).
87. Oo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.01(A), (Y) (Anderson Supp. 1987).
88. A "control share acquisition" is the direct or indirect acquisition by any person of shares of an issuing public
corporation that, when added to all other shares of the issuing public corporation held by the person, would entitle such
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acquiring person statement to the issuing corporation at its principal executive
offices. 89 The acquiring person statement must include the identity of the acquiring
person and provide that the statement is given pursuant to the Ohio Act.90 Also, the
acquiring person must state the number of shares it owns, directly or indirectly, and
the range of voting power under which the proposed control share acquisition would
fall. 9 1 Finally, the acquiring person statement must describe the terms of the control
share acquisition and represent that the acquisition is not contrary to any law. 92
Within ten days after receipt of the acquiring person statement, the Ohio
corporation must call a special meeting to vote on the proposed acquisition.93 Such
meeting must be held within fifty days after receipt of the statement. 94 The acquiring
person may make the acquisition if a majority of the shareholders represented, in
person or by proxy, approve the acquisition, and such acquisition is consummated
within 360 days following the approval. 95
The Ohio Act, in most respects, is the same as the Indiana statute. The major
difference is that while the shareholders under the Indiana statute vote to determine
what voting rights, if any, the offeror's shares will have, the Ohio Act permits the
target's shareholders to vote to deny the offeror the right to purchase any more
shares. 96 At the time the Ohio Act was considered by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, the CTS decision upholding the constitutionality of the Indiana statute had
not yet been rendered, so the court held that the Ohio Act was unconstitutional in light
of the MITE opinion. 97
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Ohio's takeover statute was
unconstitutional for two reasons. First, the court, relying on Edgar v. MITE Corp.,98
held that Ohio's requirement of a shareholder vote allowed management to delay a
takeover, and thus, the statute frustrated the objectives of the Williams Act. 99
Second, the court held that the Ohio law had a substantial impact on interstate
commerce. t0 0 In its commerce clause analysis, the court focused on the Ohio Act's
potential ability to regulate a tender offer that would not involve a single Ohio
shareholder. The district court, in addition, had pointed out that the Act could
person immediately after the acquisition to directly or indirectly, alone or with others, to exercise or direct the exercise
of the voting power of the issuing public corporation in the election of directors within any of the following ranges:
(a) One-fifth or more but less than one-third of such voting power;
(b) One-third or more but less than a majority of such voting power, or
(c) A majority or more of such voting power.
OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.01(Z)(1) (Anderson 1985).
89. Oino REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(B) (Anderson 1985).
90. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(B)(1),(2) (Anderson 1985).
91. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(B)(3),(4) (Anderson 1985).
92. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(B)(5),(6) (Anderson 1985).
93. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(C) (Anderson 1985).
94. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(C) (Anderson 1985).
95. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(E)(1),(2) (Anderson 1985).
96. Compare IND. CODE § 23-1-42-7 (1986) with OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(E)(1) (Anderson 1985).
97. Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded sub nom. Ohio v.
Fleet Aerospace, 107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987).
98. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
99. Fleet Aerospace, 796 F.2d at 139.
100. Id.
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regulate a transaction between two individuals for the sale of twenty percent of the
stock in an Ohio corporation. 1o For these reasons, the law was held unconstitutional.
Aeronca appealed. While Fleet Aerospace was on petition for certiorari, the
Supreme Court decided CTS. t02 The Supreme Court remanded Fleet Aerospace to the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of the CTS holding.t0 3
CTSt°4 considered both of the issues addressed by the Sixth Circuit. It appears that
if the district court, on further remand, does not hold the case moot, 0 5 the court of
appeals will ultimately reverse its prior decision.
The basic difference between the Indiana Act and the Ohio Act is that Indiana
shareholders may determine the voting rights of the shares held by the offeror while
Ohio shareholders may deny the offeror the right to purchase the shares.' 0 6 In
Indiana, the offeror will not purchase any more shares since they will not have voting
rights. In Ohio, the offeror will not purchase any more shares since it is forbidden.
In effect, both statutes provide the same result.
But, is the fact that Ohio can stop the offeror from purchasing shares enough to
make the law unconstitutional? Fleet Aerospace's brief points to dicta in the CTSt0 7
decision which suggests that it might: "We reiterate that this [Indiana] Act does not
prohibit any entity-resident or nonresident-from offering to purchase, or from
purchasing, shares in Indiana corporations, or from attempting thereby to gain
control."' 1 8 Also, CTS held that the Indiana law did not frustrate the Williams Act
since it did not "preclude an offerorfrom purchasing shares as soon as federal law
permits." 0 9 This dicta, although interesting, will probably not save Fleet Aerospace
from the CTS decision because the effect of the Indiana and Ohio statutes is the same.
A majority of a quorum of disinterested shareholders may stop a potential takeover
by voting against it. In Indiana, the shareholders make the acquirer's shares, both
owned and to be purchased, practically worthless by taking away their voting
privileges; while in Ohio, the shareholders may forbid the sale of stock to the
acquirer. The major complaints against the Ohio Act, namely that the Ohio Act tips
the balance in favor of incumbent management, and constitutes a direct regulation of,
as well as an indirect burden on interstate commerce, already were addressed by the
Supreme Court in CTS. 110 Is this the result intended by the Williams Act? As will be
101. FleetAerospace, 637 F. Supp. at 760-61 aff'd, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986). vacated and remanded sub nom.
Ohio v. Fleet Aerospace, 107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987).
102. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
103. Ohio v. Fleet Aerospace, 107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987). Recently, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the
case to the district court to be decided on moomess grounds since the parties settled the takeover dispute. Fleet Aerospace
v. Holderman, 848 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1988).
104. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
105. See supra note 103.
106. Compare IND. CODE §§ 23-1-42-7,-9 (1986) with OHto REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Anderson 1985).
107. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
108. Appellee's Brief at 5, Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman. 848 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1988) (No. 86-3533) (citing
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987)) (emphasis added) (on file at the Ohio State Law Journal).
109. CTS. 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1647 (1987) (emphasis added).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
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seen, the CTS1II and Fleet Aerospace' 12 decisions each give states increased power
to protect its businesses at the expense of the shareholders-clearly not the intent of
the Williams Act.
VI. STATE AND JUDICIAL CIRCUMVENTION OF THE WILLIAMS ACT
Both the Indiana and Ohio acts permit a majority of a quorum of disinterested
shareholders to make a decision affecting whether all shareholders may sell their
stock to the acquirer. The Supreme Court exhalted the benefits of such group decision
making in CTS stating that "[i]n such a situation under the Indiana Act, the
shareholders as a group, acting in the corporation's best interest, could reject the
offer, although individual shareholders might be inclined to accept it."' 3 This
disturbing language is inconsistent with the intent of the Williams Act. This Part will
review the legislative history of the Williams Act and propose amendments to the
Williams Act aimed at preventing states and courts from circumventing this intent.
A. The Intent of the Williams Act
As emphasized above, states and courts have sought group decision making in
order to promote a course of action in the corporation's best interest. Nothing in the
Williams Act seeks to protect the corporation's best interest. The Williams Act was
enacted to ensure that individual shareholders are provided adequate information
necessary to make an informed investment decision whether to sell or retain their
shares.1 4 The legislative history implies that the Williams Act was designed to
protect the investor and provide each investor with adequate time and information to
make the best investment decision for the investor. The best investment decision for
each investor individually is not necessarily the best course of action for the
corporation.
The legislative history provides evidence of Congress' intent to give each
investor the chance to do what is best for himself or herself. For example, the
legislative history explains that "the investment decision-whether to retain the
security or sell it-is in substance little different from the decision made on an
original purchase of a security or on an offer to exchange one security for
another.""15 The legislative history constantly refers to the shareholder as an investor
making an investment decision. An investment decision means the best course of
action for the investor, even if it is at the expense of the corporation. It is unlikely the
shareholder/investor initially purchased the security to benefit the corporation: the
decision was made to profit the investor. Similarly, the decision whether to retain or
sell the security during a takeover situation should be made on the same basis.
111. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
112. 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded sub nom. Ohio v. Fleet Aerospace, 107 S. Ct. 1949
(1987).
113. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1646 (emphasis added).
114. Note, Defining "Tender Offer" Under The Williams Act, 53 BROOKLYN L. REv. 189, 190 (1987) (citing S. REP.
No. 550, 90th Cong., 'st Sess. 3 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Seass. 3 (1968)).
115. 1968 U.S. CODF NEws, supra note 1, at 2813.
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Investors purchase stock in a corporation for any number of reasons. They choose to
sell their stock for as many different reasons. Thus, the best investment decision for
one investor may not be the best investment decision for another. A group decision,
therefore, should not stop an investor from doing what is in his or her own best
interest.
Appellate courts previously have recognized Congress' intent to allow each
shareholder the opportunity to make the best investment decision. In Martin-Marietta
Corp. v. Bendix Corp., for example, the Sixth Circuit held that by "[n]either
favoring incumbent management nor the takeover bidder, Congress adopted a policy
of 'evenhandedness,' thereby permitting the investor to make his own independent
but informed decision whether to sell. ' ' 116
Congress, in enacting the Williams Act, wanted to avoid "tipping the balance
of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the
takeover bid. '117 By permitting group decision making, the state has tipped the
balance in favor of management. Allowing a majority of only a quorum of
disinterested shareholders to make the decision for every shareholder makes it
possible for a potentially very small number of shares to dictate if the takeover may
proceed. The smaller the number of shares that can thwart a takeover, the easier
management's task of gaining support for its position. All that management need do
is convince these few shares to vote against the takeover and the takeover will fail.
Before group decision making was permitted, management's task was far greater
since more shares had to be convinced to reject the takeover offer. Allowing
management to successfully thwart a takeover with less shareholder support tips the
balance of regulation in favor of management. Since the Williams Act was enacted
expressly to favor neither management nor the person making the takeover offer, 18
any state regulation favoring one side over the other is contrary to the intent of the
Williams Act.
B. Proposed Amendments To The Williams Act
Congress should respond to the recent trend of state takeover legislation by
clarifying the intent of the Williams Act and by directly prohibiting certain control
share act provisions. One amendment to the Williams Act should be a more precise
definition of Congress' intent. There should be a provision, for example, stating that
the Act only intends to protect shareholders from the natural coercive atmosphere of
a takeover: that each investor be provided adequate time and information to enable the
investor to make the best personal investment decision. This amendment would
116. Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 567 (6th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added). See also Great
Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1276 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 443 U.S. 173 (1978); Fleet
Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742, 758-59 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated
and remanded sub nom. Ohio v. Fleet Aerospace, 107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987); Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership
and in Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcommittee on Banking and Commerce, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 17, 19, 25, 182 (1967) (statements of Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, SEC), 113 CoNG. REC. 854-55 (1967).
117. 1968 U.S. ConE NExvs, supra note 1, at 2813.
118. Id.
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provide the courts with clear standards to evaluate congressional intent and to
evaluate state regulation of takeovers.
Congress also should amend the Williams Act to explicitly forbid states from
allowing groups to determine how other security holders may handle their invest-
ments. This amendment would promote impartial regulation of takeovers. Both
management and persons attempting a takeover would have an equal burden in
gaining the necessary support needed either to complete or to stop a potential
takeover. 119
Corporate law is state-created law and courts have traditionally recognized the
states' power to regulate their own corporations and intrastate securities sales and
exchanges.120 The SEC has "forcefully opposed suggestions to displace fully the
authority of the states." 12' The Supreme Court has noted that "[c]orporations are
creatures of state law ... [and] except where federal law expressly requires certain
responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the
internal affairs of the corporation."'' 22 The proposed amendments, however, do not
seek to federalize corporate law. They are merely an attempt to clarify the intent of
the Williams Act and to protect shareholders' investments. States are affected by
these proposals only to the extent that their statutes conflict with the Williams Act.
These proposed amendments would protect the investors as well as provide an
equitable arena for takeover battles. These amendments are also designed to promote
economic efficiency. 123
C. The Economic Effects Of The Proposed Amendments
In analyzing the economic effects of the proposed amendments, it should be
noted that the goal of these amendments is to promote economic efficiency in
takeover situations. Economic efficiency results when goods and resources are being
used where their value is highest.' 24 In this subpart, the Note will examine two
benefits shareholders would receive if the proposed amendments were enacted. First,
the mere presence of potential offerors benefits shareholders even if no tender offer
is made. Second, a takeover battle waged in a fair and impartial arena benefits both
the shareholders and society.
119. This author believes that management should also be prohibited from adopting certain antitakeover provisions
in the corporation's articles of incorporation. In other words, corporations, through incumbent management, should be
prohibited from adopting provisions that would violate the Williams Act if enacted by a state. This argument, however,
is beyond the scope of the Williams Act and this Note. For a discussion of this issue, see Easterbrook & Fisehel, The
Proper Role of a Target's Management In Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); but cf. Lipton,
Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: A Response to Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1231
(1980).
120. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 45.
121. Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 111, 112 (1987) (citing Amendments to
Tender Offer Rules: All-Holders and Best-Price, Exchange Act Release No. 23,241, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,873 (July 17,
1986)).
122. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1976) (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)).
123. See infra subpart C.
124. R. POSNER, THE EcoNositc ANALYSIS OF LAW 9 (3d ed. 1986).
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1. The Benefits of a Potential Takeover
From the foregoing discussion of the policy behind the Williams Act, it is
apparent that Congress wants security holders to have the relevant information
necessary to make the best investment decision. In a perfect market, security holders
would constantly monitor management's actions to weigh the effectiveness of their
decisions. Shareholders, however, have no incentive to act as monitor. No one
shareholder can realize even a small amount of the benefits available from monitoring
management since the benefits are dispersed according to each shareholder's
investment and not according to his or her monitoring efforts. 125 Because other
shareholders benefit from any one shareholder's monitoring efforts without contrib-
uting to the monitoring costs, each shareholder has an incentive to remain passive. 126
Although individual shareholders do not have an incentive to monitor management,
corporate raiders constantly monitor management's activities in order to find a
potential target.
The proposed amendments to the Williams Act will prevent states from adopting
antitakeover provisions. Without these provisions, potential tender offerors will be
"on the lookout" for a good deal and provide the necessary monitoring function. As
recognized by Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel:
Tender offers are a method of monitoring the work of management teams. Prospective
bidders monitor the performance of managerial teams by comparing a corporation's potential
value with its value (as reflected by share prices) under current management. When the
difference between the market price of a firm's shares and the price those shares might have
under different circumstances becomes too great, an outsider can profit by buying the firm
and improving its management. The outsider reduces the free riding problem because it
owns a majority of the shares. The source of the premium is the reduction in agency costs,
which make the firm's assets worth more in the hands of the acquiror than they were worth
in the hands of the firm's managers.
... [Sihareholders benefit even if their corporation never is the subject of a tender offer.
The process of monitoring by outsiders poses a continuous threat of takeover if performance
lags. Managers will attempt to reduce agency costs in order to reduce the chance of takeover,
and the process of reducing agency costs leads to higher prices for shares. 27
To take advantage of the monitoring benefits realized through the presence of
tender offers, states should be prohibited from adopting antitakeover provisions.
These provisions reduce shareholders' and society's benefits since shareholders are
denied the premium the tender offer would have provided, while society is denied the
social gain from the potentially superior use of the corporation's assets. 128
125. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 119. at 1171.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1173-74. Agency costs are the costs to the principal of obtaining faithful and effective performance by
his agents. Posrit,supra note 124, at 368. Having someone benefit from the work of another without sharing in the costs
is refered to as "free riding." Id. at 55.
128. Easterbrook & Fischel. supra note 119. at 1174-75. Takeovers, on the average, are good for the shareholders
and the economy. Studies have shown that companies involved in takeovers experience abnormal stock price increases.
For a detailed study of the effects to shareholders and the economy, see Jensen, Takeovers: Folklore and Science, 62
HARV. Bus. REV. 109 (Nov./Dec. 1984).
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2. Increased Efficiency Through Fair Takeover Battles
The goal of the proposed amendments is to increase economic efficiency in
takeover situations. 129 Antitakeover devices have been defended on the basis that the
acquiring corporation will not use the target's resources any more productively than
incumbent management. 130 In fact, it is impossible to determine who will utilize the
target's resources most efficiently without the benefit of hindsight. Since such a
determination is impossible, the best means of making the decision is to allow the free
market to decide. The free market will allow the person who most values the target's
resources to have them. In a takeover situation, both incumbent management and the
tender offeror will assess how much they value having control of the corporation.
This assessment will include the value of the corporation's resources and how these
resources will be utilized under incumbent management or the tender offeror's
control. Then, incumbent management 131 and the tender offeror will engage in a
bidding war until the person who values the corporation more wins. Meanwhile, the
shareholders will recognize the premiums of the bidding process through an increase
in the share price.
Congress should act to promote economic efficiency. This can be done only
through promoting impartial legislation. States should be prohibited from helping
their corporations at the expense of the corporation's shareholders. Corporations take
a risk by selling ownership to the public and the threat of losing control of the
corporation is simply part of that risk. Shareholders do need protection from the
coercive nature of a takeover; however, they also need protection from states and
management that would lower the value of their investment.
VII. CONCLUSION
In enacting the Williams Act, Congress was concerned with the natural coercive
nature of a tender offer. Congress sought to provide shareholders with adequate time
and information to enable them to make the best investment decision. Since the
enactment of the Williams Act, states have passed statutes aimed at protecting their
corporations from hostile takeovers. These protectionist statutes have been justified
as protecting the shareholders. These statutes, however, have been challenged as
violating the Constitution and as being inconsistent with the Williams Act. The trend
of current judicial decisions is to permit progressively more protectionist statutes.
Recently, for example, Delaware has proposed an antitakeover statute that could
delay a takeover attempt up to three years. 132
129. See supra text accompanying note 124.
130. See Lipton, supra note 119.
131. Incumbent management is prohibited from attempting to maintain control through the use of corporate funds.
See, Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986). If incumbent management wishes to maintain control,
they must find alternative financing.
132. Delaware proposed a new takeover law which will stall an unwanted buyer who acquires more than 15% of a
target company's stock from completing the takeover for three years. There are three exceptions to this rule:
1. if the buyer purchases 85% of the stock, excluding shares held by directors who are officers and certain shares
held under employee stock plans;
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These statutes are contrary to the intent of the Williams Act and promote
inefficiencies in the marketplace. The Williams Act should be amended to state more
specifically its intent and eliminate the ambiguity that has allowed states and courts
to justify these harmful statutes. The focus of the legislation should be to protect the
shareholders as well as to promote economic efficiency. Until this is done, states will
be permitted to help their corporations at the expense of the shareholders.
Anthony L. Foti
2. if two-thirds of the voting shares at a special election vote for the acquisition; or
3. if the board of directors opt out from the provisions of the statute.
Del. Code Ann. tit.8, § 203 (1988); See Labaton, Debate Over A New Takeover Law, N. Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1988, at D 1,
col. 3.
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